
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
The Impact of the Crisis on Employment
and the Role of Labour Market Institutions






The Impact of the Crisis on Employment 
























P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











The Impact of the Crisis on Employment 
and the Role of Labour Market Institutions 
 
The paper takes a comparative perspective on the labour market impact on G20 and EU 
countries of the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008. It starts from the 
observation that the decline in employment and rise in unemployment in relation to output or 
GDP reductions varies significantly across countries. It examines the impacts from an 
institutional perspective taking into account different channels of external, internal and wage 
flexibility determined by both the institutional arrangements in place before the crisis and 
discretionary reforms implemented during the crisis. Emphasis is placed on the role of 
permanent and temporary jobs, working time adjustment, wage flexibility and active and 
passive labour market policies. The paper shows that, at least for the time being, 
unemployment increases have been contained in countries with comparatively strong internal 
flexibility. At the same time, however, it appears that the crisis has – at least in some cases – 
contributed to a further dualization of labour markets given that risks are allocated unequally 
across types of employment. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J58, J65, J21 
  





Werner Eichhorst  
IZA 
P.O. Box 7240 
53072 Bonn 
Germany 




Introduction and framework for the analysis.............................................................................1 
A.  Labour market impacts ...................................................................................................2 
B.  the labour market impacts of the crisis.........................................10  Factors influencing 
  .................................................14  1. External flexibility......................................................
  ility: different practices within firms.................................................20  2. Internal flexib
  ................................................................21  3. Wage setting ................................................
4.  Active and passive labour market policies................................................................23 
C.  .......................27  Country case studies ..............................................................................
   Employment stability despite strong export orientation.......................27  1. Germany:
  ark.......................................................................................................................28  2. Denm












                                                
Introduction and framework for the analysis 
 
Although the financial and economic downturn that began in 2008 was global in nature, the 
impact of the crisis – e.g. the intensity and timing – is rather heterogeneous across countries. 
However, there is much to learn about the nature of these differences in terms of impacts and 
what has worked in those countries to limit the labour market consequences of the economic 
shock.  
 
Various factors influence the labour market effects of the crisis. The structure of the 
economy, for example, plays an important role as vulnerable sectors constitute a larger share 
in some countries than in others. In other instances, countries where the financial sector has a 
relatively high employment share – such as the United States and the United Kingdom and to 
a lesser degree Ireland – were hit first and hard as the crisis spread throughout the financial 
system. Similarly, countries are also affected by the varying degrees of exposure to 
downturns in housing markets, construction sectors and manufacturing exports. 
 
In addition, fiscal efforts to address the consequences of the downturn were put in place by 
many governments soon after the effects of the crisis started to take shape. Globally, the IMF 
reported that the average size of discretionary fiscal measures in 2009 was 1.9 per cent of 
GDP in advanced G20 countries (approximately 30 per cent on infrastructure) and 2.2 per 
cent of GDP in emerging and developing G20 countries (approximately 50 per cent on 
infrastructure).
1 Such measures had an undeniably positive impact as global growth for 2010 
is expected to rise above 4.5 per cent.
2 
 
Finally, another very important consideration, and the main focus of this paper, is the 
characterization of labour market institutions in place. Although less examined in the current 
context, labour market institutions – including in particular employment protection 
legislation, unemployment benefits and active labour market programmes (ALMPs) – have 
played a key role in absorbing and accommodating the severe shock and in mitigating 
immediate negative labour market and social impacts. In light of data constraints, the scope 
of the paper will be limited to the analysis of G20 and some EU countries where a range of 
economic, labour and institutional data is currently available. 
 
The role of labour market institutions in determining employment outcomes has been a 
widely debated topic in recent research. For instance, there is evidence based on comparative 
panel data that finds wage setting, employment protection, active labour market policies, 
unemployment benefit systems and taxation have an impact on employment and 
unemployment rates
3 and on job tenure.
4 There is a lack of consensus about the specific 
contribution of particular institutional provisions while others disagree about the relative role 
of institutional factors vis-à-vis macroeconomic shocks.
5,6 Moreover, researchers also point 
 
1 See Horton et al. (2009). 
2 According to the world output projections of the IMF (2010). 
3 See for example, Layard et al. (2005); and Bassanini and Duval (2006). 
4 See for example Cazes et al. (forthcoming). 
5 See Baker et al. (2005); and Eichhorst et al. (2008). 




                                                
to the fact that interactions between institutions and more complex institutional arrangements 
can be more relevant than single institutions.
7  
 
A more integrated and dynamic perspective, however, suggests that institutional patterns 
interact with the macroeconomic perspective and that labour market outcomes are strongly 
influenced by the channels of employment adjustment in a certain institutional setting. While 
most research addresses the issue of institutional effects on unemployment persistence after a 
macroeconomic shock, it is also plausible to assume that institutions influence short-term 
adjustments in the labour market at the early stages of an economic crisis.
8 This paper will 
attempt to clarify this analysis. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper is organised in four parts. The first part (Section A) of 
the paper will focus on assessing the main labour market and economic indicators with a 
view to illustrating the extent and country variation in the impacts of the crisis. Section B will 
analyse the role of labour market institutions in shaping the different crisis outcomes among 
countries. In particular, against the backdrop of the cross-country labour market impacts of 
the crisis, this section considers that this heterogeneity is not just “accidental”, but that it is 
influenced considerably by established core labour market institutions – i.e. initial 
employment protection (strict/loose), the generosity of unemployment benefits and active 
labour market policies as well as the structure of collective bargaining (i.e. centralised vs. 
decentralised and high vs. low coverage). Various clusters of countries will be defined by 
combining countries with similar labour market institutions and crisis outcomes. 
 
The third section, Section C, will supplement the above analysis with a more detailed study 
of typical country cases. This will provide a more conclusive picture of the variety of the 
institutional setup in different countries and how they have shaped outcomes to date. Finally, 
Section D will conclude and suggest some policy instruments that may help shape an 






In 2007, the rapid employment growth that preceded the crisis began to slow, and by 2008 all 
regions of the world of work had experienced a deceleration of employment growth. In the 
G20 countries, year-on-year employment growth fell from around 1.9 per cent to -1.2 per 
cent between the beginning of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 1, panel A). And 
although negative growth rates have started to decline, until the beginning of 2010 growth 
rates had not yet turned positive. When comparing year-on-year employment growth between 
the first quarters of 2010–09, 2009–08 and 2008–07, 14 of the 19 G20 countries analysed had 
moved to negative growth rates by the first quarter of 2009, and by the first quarter of 2010 
only Turkey had returned to pre-crisis growth rates (Figure 1, panel B).  
 
7 See Hall and Soskice (2001); and Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) 




Figure 1. Year-on-year percentage change in employment in G20, 2008–2010 








































































































































































2008 Q1 - 2007 Q1
2009 Q1 - 2008 Q1
2010 Q1 - 2009 Q1
 
*India and Saudi Arabia are not taken into account because information is not available. EU27 as group is 
included in the calculations. 
Note: Growth rates are year-on-year changes. Employment data for Argentina, Brazil and China correspond to 
urban areas. Data are seasonally adjusted. 
Source: IILS estimates based on Eurostat database; ILO, Laborsta database and OECD. 
 
By early 2009, employment losses rose to historically high levels in a majority of countries 
(ILO, 2009). Some advanced G20 countries such as the United States and the United 




                                                
throughout the financial system.
9 In other advanced economies, job losses were initially 
contained but eventually accelerated as the effects of lower confidence and lower demand – 
mutually reinforcing factors – took hold. For the EU 15, job losses totalled 6.2 million 
between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2010. 
 
Even among the emerging G20 countries, which were not affected directly by the financial 
crisis at first, job losses during the second and fourth quarters 2008 amounted to 2.5 
million.
10 Initially, the instability stemming from US sub-prime mortgages was contained and 
did not spill over to emerging and developing economies. But soon, the extent of the inter-
linkages emerged, and the negative effects of the financial turmoil spread to the real economy 
through a number of transmission channels. Particularly significant was the fact that trade 
volumes fell as a result of lower demand, and so export-oriented economies were deeply 
affected. Some countries were hit hard by the economic downturn and lower commodity 
prices, given the relative significance of manufactured exports and/or primary exports (e.g. 
Argentina); or by falling commodity prices for metals such as nickel, lead and zinc (e.g. 





The combination of new labour market entrants and recent job losers looking for employment 
led in many cases to a rapid increase in the unemployment rate: in G20 countries the 
unemployment rate surpassed 9 per cent at the beginning of 2010 (Figure 2, panel A). Rapid 
increases have occurred across countries, with unemployment levels rising by close to 
19  million between the first quarters of 2008 and 2010, bringing the total number of 
individuals unemployed in these countries to close to 74 million.  
 
Between the first quarters of 2008 and 2010, the unemployment rate rose nearly 2.5 
percentage points (Figure 2, panel A). And by country, among all G20 and EU countries 
analysed, only Argentina, Brazil, Germany and Indonesia experienced decreases in the 
unemployment rate (Figure 2, panel B). Over the same period, for the EU27, the rise in 
unemployment rates has been above the G20 average – 2.9 percentage points. The hardest hit 
Member State economies in the EU, in terms of the increase in unemployment, are Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, with changes above 13 percentage points. Spain follows a similar trend 
with its unemployment rate more than doubling increasing from 9.6 per cent in 2008 to over 
20 per cent in 2010. Unemployment rates have also grown in the emerging G20 countries 
although less significantly (on average 1.8 percentage points in the seven quarters leading up 
to the first quarter 2010). 
 
9 See V. Escudero, 2009 “Effects of the Crisis on the Financial Sector: Trends and Policy Issues”. See also 
Annex A for a discussion of the sectoral distribution of employment over the past two decades. 
10 This figure corresponds to a net calculation and as such it does not take into account the heterogeneity of the 
timing of the crisis effects. When the total amount of jobs lost per country is taken into account in the 
calculation (change from peak to trough, which is country specific), the total number of jobs lost increases to 8.3 




Figure 2. Increase in unemployment rates since the onset of the crisis  
(percentages) 









Panel B. By country  



























































































































































































































































































































Unemployment data for Argentina and Brazil correspond to urban areas.  
**China, India and Saudi Arabia are not taken into account given unavailability of information.  
Note: Averages correspond to weighted averages.  
Source: IILS estimates based on Eurostat database and ILO, Laborsta database. 




                                                
… which has increased the odds of structural unemployment. 
 
Generally, inflow and outflow rates, to and from unemployment, tend to be cyclical, i.e. 
following upward and downward economic trends.
11 More precisely, during economic 
recessions the inflow rate increases as people become unemployed and the outflow rate 
decreases as the slowdown in the economy makes it harder for unemployed workers to find 
jobs. Available data for a small group of advanced G20 economies regarding inflow/outflow 
rates provide key information about the dynamics of the labour market, especially with regard 
to potential weaknesses and strengths near turning points.
12  
 
Although this cyclicality holds true for all countries and periods analysed, the relationship 
between unemployment inflows and outflows differs across countries and has varied over 
time.
13 During previous recessions increases in the inflow rate and decreases in the outflow 
rate were less severe; but during this recent crisis many countries have attained historical 
highs and lows. In the current context, there have been slow but continuous decreases in the 
outflow rate, which hints that the recovery too will be slower than previous downturns. 
Indeed, the current crisis appears to be marked by a shift in inflow and outflow rates from 
their performance during non-crises times but also from that of previous crises. The pace at 
which workers move into, and out of, unemployment has changed – with potentially 




11 For analysis of the US labour market, see Daly et al. (2009); Tasci and Fee (2009). For analysis of other 
European and OECD countries see Elsby et al. (2008); Albaek and Sørensen (1998); Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2008); Bertola and Rogerson (1997); Pissarides (1986).    
12 This analysis is based on updated figures (for 2007, 2008 and estimates for 2009) of the workbook produced 
by Elsby et al. (2008).    
13 Lack of available information regarding quarterly unemployment rates and annual unemployment levels by 




Figure 3. Evolution of inflow and outflow rates in the G7 countries, 1989-2009 




















































































































































































































Notes: Figures for 2009 are estimations. The onsets of crisis periods are defined as the first point of sustained 
moderation of economic growth.  Shaded areas therefore show GDP recession years from that point onwards. 
Source: IILS estimates; Elsby et al. 2008 and OECD statistics. 
 
In fact, in examining previous recessions, the unemployment rate continues to rise even as 




                                                
generally do not resume hiring until the recovery is well under way).
14 During the 2001 
recession, for example, outflow rates remained low because firms were slow to hire. The 
current high share of workers on reduced working hours or who are now employed part-time, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, suggests that employers are likely to tap into existing 
workforces (part-time employment and temporary workers) rather than hiring new workers.
15 
This would result in a very slow pick-up of the outflow rate, adding to the risks of jobless 




Significant cross-country differences exist in terms of the labour market impacts of the 
current economic crisis (Figure 4). Analysing the evolution of economic and employment 
growth since the onset of the crisis suggests several trends: 
  Among the advanced G20 countries analysed, the best-off countries (relative to the 
developed countries’ median)
16 are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France and the 
Republic of Korea. The countries hardest hit to date seem to be Finland, Japan and 
Luxembourg in terms of output losses and Spain in terms of employment losses, with 
Ireland the most affected country on both fronts.
17 
  Among the emerging G20 countries analysed, Indonesia, Malta and Cyprus, for 
example, were the least affected on both fronts (relative to the median of the group). 
Argentina and Brazil are also good examples, especially in terms of the employment 
effects. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, were the hardest hit both in economic growth 
and employment losses; and Turkey and the Russian Federation suffered from big 
economic losses relative to other countries, but less employment losses.  
  In the majority of G20 countries, employment losses were less severe compared to 
GDP declines. Exceptions include Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Africa, 
Spain and the United States.    
  To the first quarter of 2010, employment in 30 per cent of the advanced G20 countries 
and 40 per cent of the emerging G20 countries continued to be affected by the crisis. 
What is more, two years after the onset of the crisis, only 1 advanced country and 8 
emerging ones has fully recovered pre-crisis employment levels.
18   
 
 
14 See, for example, Daly et al. (2009). 
15 For a more in depth analysis of policies to retain employment during the current crisis, please see section A of 
the World of Work Report 2009 (ILO, 2009a). 
16 GDP growth and employment were analysed relative to the median of growth and employment changes for 
the group of countries analysed. 
17 Throughout the course of 2010, countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are also confronted with a 
number of fiscal challenges.  
18 For more detail on the employment recovery analysis, see Chapter 1 of the World of Work Report 2010 (ILO, 




Figure 4. Variation of real GDP and total employment in the G20 and EU countries since 
the onset of the crisis 



































































































Note: The division between Advanced and Emerging G20 countries is based on a median calculated on per 
capita GDP for the period. Changes in GDP and employment are growth rates measured from peak to trough 
(where a trough has not yet been attained, the latest available information is used). The comparison across 
countries in the same group is done relative to the group’s median. 
Source: IILS estimates based on: OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86; Eurostat database; ILO, Laborsta database; 






As seen in the previous section, countries have responded to varying degrees to the crisis, and 
with varying degrees of success. A number of factors have moderated the labour market 
impacts of the crisis on individual countries. For starters, fiscal stimulus packages – 
especially those that were timely and properly targeted – played a key role in alleviating the 
negative effects of the crisis (Figure 5). In some cases, e.g. Thailand, Kazakhstan and China, 
the measures as a percentage of GDP far exceed 10 per cent. Of course, fiscal stimulus was 
very much a function of initial conditions and adequate fiscal space. 
 












































































































































































































































































































































Note: the definition and contents of the policy measures vary from country to country and therefore the size of 
these packages may not be comparable across countries. This is complicated by the fact that the stimulus 
packages, especially in many developing countries, do not take into consideration the use of automatic 
stabilisers, e.g. increased use of existing programmes such as unemployment benefits. 
Source: IILS calculations based on World of Work Report 2010 (ILO, 2010a). 
 
 
The structure of the economy also plays an important role, as vulnerable sectors constitute a 
larger share in some countries compared to others, i.e. sectors that tend to be affected by the 
global economic crisis significantly. In particular, countries which rely heavily on 
manufacturing (such as many CEE countries) suffered from a severe output shock in this 
segment (Figure 6). In other cases, given that the crisis started to some extent in the housing 
sector, countries like Spain with relatively large construction sectors were dramatically hit by 
employment losses in these sectors. 









































































































































































































































Source: Eurostat, based on OECD analysis of vulnerable sectors 
 
Another important consideration in this regard - although less studied - is the capacity of 
labour market institutions (EPL, wage setting, unemployment benefits and ALMPs) to absorb 
and accommodate shocks. In order to develop a more integrated and dynamic perspective on 
adjustment to external shocks, external flexibility defined by typical labour market 
institutions cannot be seen as the only channel of influence. Following the classical work of 
Atkinson (1984), the dimension of internal flexibility warrants attention, and it is worth 
distinguishing between functional and numerical flexibility. Indeed, four different types of 
labour market flexibility can be distinguished:  
  External numerical flexibility: the possibility to adapt the number of employees to the 
economic situation. Determinants are the strictness of employment protection for 
open-ended and fixed-term contracts and the quantitative availability of labour. 
  Internal numerical flexibility: achieved without variations in the number of staff. 
Allows for adjustment of working time via overtime or working time accounts in 
order to meet a company’s current utilisation rate. 
  External functional flexibility: requires a skilled labour force adaptable to structural 
changes. A prerequisite for an adaptable labour force is the provision of appropriate 
primary, secondary and tertiary education to create a basis for life-long learning. Skill 
mismatch in the labour market can be avoided by promoting occupational mobility 
through active labour market policies, in particular job placement and training. 
  Internal functional flexibility: ability to react to changing demand with a flexible 
(re)organisation of the production process. This requires broad and well-educated 
employees able to perform different tasks. 
 
Furthermore, adjustment of wages is an additional element of flexibility.  




Regarding labour market institutions, it is useful to differentiate between employment 
protection on the one hand and labour market policies – active and passive – on the other.
19 
This helps to identify various possible models of flexibility, e.g. countries with strong 
dismissal protection have alternative options to compensate for a lack of external flexibility 
such as working-time flexibility. Table 1 summarises the various flexibility models. 
 
Table 1. Flexibility models 
 
Employment protection (core) 
 






































e.g. United Kingdom) 
Source: IZA. 
 
With this in mind, this section takes a closer look at three kinds of labour institutions: (i) 
those related to external flexibility (e.g. dismissal protection, fixed-term employment, 
temporary agency work); (ii) those related to internal flexibility (working time reductions, 
wage flexibility and subsidised short-time work schemes); and, (iii) policy/programme 
buffers such as active labour market policies (employer subsidies, placement, training) and 
unemployment benefits (contributory as well as means-tested).  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, various clusters with similar patterns of flexibility were 
created, based on an indicator developed by Eichhorst, Marx and Tobsch (2009). Due to data 
limitations on internal flexibility, however, the analysis has been divided in two groups: one 
with external and wage flexibility only, and one including internal flexibility. Starting with 
the former, the groupings strongly resemble established typologies (Figure 7). The first 
cluster comprises nine Scandinavian and Continental-European countries and can be labelled 
‘education-based’. It is characterised by low external numerical and wage flexibility 
alongside high external functional flexibility. The second cluster (Asian and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries) combines high external numerical and wage flexibility with intermediate external 
functional flexibility and can be called ‘market-oriented I’. The third group consists of the 
four CEE countries, which have high external functional and wage flexibility, but very low 
external functional flexibility (‘market-oriented II’). Finally, the Southern European cases 
form a cluster which is characterised by rather low flexibility in all dimensions (‘low 
flexibility cluster’).  
 
                                                 
19 It is important to note that in many emerging and developing countries, labour market adjustments tend to be 
associated with increases in informal employment – a factor which is not captured by the more formal 




































































                                Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
        C A S E         0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label            Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
=
  Finland            7   ─┐ 
  Germany            9   ─┼─┐ 
  Belgium            3   ─┘ ├─────────┐ 
  Austria            2   ───┘         ├─┐ 
  Denmark            6   ───┬─────────┘ │ 
  Sweden            22   ───┘           ├─────────────────────────────────┐ 
  Norway            17   ───┬───────┐   │                                 │ 
  Switzerland       23   ───┘       ├───┘                                 │ 
  Netherlands       15   ───────────┘                                     │ 
  Canada             4   ─┬───┐                                           │ 
  United Kingdom    24   ─┘   ├─────┐                                     │ 
  Ireland           11   ─┬─┐ │     │                                     │ 
  New Zealand       16   ─┘ ├─┘     ├───────────────────────────┐         │ 
  Australia          1   ───┘       │                           │         │ 
  Japan             13   ───┬─────┐ │                           │         │ 
  Korea             14   ───┘     ├─┘                           │         │ 
  United States     25   ─────────┘                             ├─────────┘ 
  Czech Republic     5   ─┬───┐                                 │ 
  Slovak Republic   20   ─┘   ├─────────────────┐               │ 
  Hungary           10   ─┬───┘                 │               │ 
  Poland            18   ─┘                     ├───────────────┘ 
  France             8   ─┬─────┐               │ 
  Spain             21   ─┘     ├─┐             │ 
  Portugal          19   ───────┘ ├─────────────┘ 
  Italy             12   ─────────┘=
Source: IZA estimates. 
 
Results of the second cluster analysis including internal flexibility are reported in Figure 8. 
With respect to external flexibility, the Continental and Scandinavian countries are quite 
similar, although Denmark and Sweden are treated as a separate cluster as both exhibit strong 
internal numerical flexibility, while internal functional flexibility prevails. As such, 
functional elements (internally and externally) are very important in Denmark and Sweden so 
that their cluster is termed ‘functional model’. The remaining Scandinavian countries together 
with the Continental countries form the second cluster, are characterised by an extensive use 
of working-time arrangements (especially Germany, Finland and France), but only by 
intermediate functional flexibility. In the third cluster, internal flexibility is clearly 
underdeveloped. It is formed by three Southern European countries (‘low flexibility model’). 
And finally, the fourth cluster consists of cases that reveal very high external and wage 
flexibility and is therefore labelled ‘market model’. The heterogeneous group comprises two 
Anglo-Saxon and three CEE countries. Contrary to what one might expect, most of these 
countries do not completely lack internal flexibility, but display an average level of both sub-
indicators. The following sections analyse each dimension of labour market flexibility in 
more detail. 
 













































                                Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
        C A S E         0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label            Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
=
  Czech Republic     5   ─┐ 
  United Kingdom    22   ─┼───┐ 
  Ireland           11   ─┘   ├───────┐ 
  Hungary           10   ───┬─┘       │ 
  Poland            24   ───┘         ├───────────────────────────────────┐ 
  Italy             12   ─┐           │                                   │ 
  Spain             19   ─┼───────────┘                                   │ 
  Portugal          17   ─┘                                               │ 
  Denmark            6   ───┬───────┐                                     │ 
  Sweden            20   ───┘       │                                     │ 
  Austria            2   ─┬─┐       ├─────────────────────────────────────┘ 
  France             8   ─┘ ├─┐     │ 
  Germany            9   ───┘ ├─────┘ 
  Belgium            3   ─┬─┐ │ 
  Netherlands       14   ─┘ ├─┘ 
  Finland            7   ───┘=
 




In times of crisis, the debate regarding the appropriate level of strictness of employment 
protection gains momentum. A certain level of regulation is necessary in order to protect 
workers from arbitrary decisions regarding dismissals and the use of temporary contracts, as 
well as to have firms internalize some of the social costs of labour turnover. However, 
excessive employment protection may also restrain the ability of firms to quickly respond to 
technological changes and consumer demand, as well as the capacity of a national labour 
market to adapt to sudden economic shocks. Finding a balance between protecting workers 
and allocating labour to its most productive use is therefore a key priority for policy makers, 
drawing on a range of policy measures including employment protection.  
 
This section examines: a) the different levels of EPL strictness across the G17 countries for 
which information is available and b) the variation of such strictness during the last two 
decades in order to shed light on how these changes may have affected the impact of 
economic downturns on employment.
20 
 
                                                 
20 Data for this analysis is taken from the employment protection database of OECD, which provides 
information for 17 of the 19 G20 countries (information for Argentina and Saudi Arabia is not yet available). A 
number of EU countries with available information have also been included. These countries are: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 




                                                
EPL varies considerably across countries… 
 
The level of stringency of employment protection varies significantly across countries and 
across type of EPL (Figure 9). Overall, among the G17 countries, the strictest employment 
protection of temporary forms of employment is in Turkey, Mexico and Brazil, while the 
least strict is in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Regarding protection of 
permanent workers, Indonesia, Portugal, India and China are at the top, whilst the United 
States and to a lesser degree Canada and the UK are at the bottom in terms of strictness of 
regulation. It is noteworthy that much of the cross-country variation in overall employment 
protection is due to differences in the level of regulation on temporary contracts.
21 Finally, 
countries with the highest amount of specific requirements for collective dismissal are Italy, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, whereas in Brazil, India and Indonesia these requirements have 
not yet been included in their legislation for employment protection. 
 
When comparing averages between high and medium GDP per capita countries other 
interesting findings arise: the overall indicator for both groups of countries is relatively close 
(2.2 and 2.48, respectively in a scale of 0 to 6). Regulations on regular contracts are slightly 
stricter in the medium GDP per capita group, mainly because of more stringent regulations in 
China, India and Indonesia. On the contrary, additional requirements for collective dismissal 
are less severe in the emerging group given that Brazil, India and Indonesia have no such 
arrangements. It is important to take into account, however, that strictness of employment 




21 There are generally few or no restrictions on the use of temporary contracts in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In 
contrast, in Turkey and Mexico, temporary agency work is illegal and fixed-term contracts can only be used in 




Figure 9. Strictness of employment protection, 2008  
(Scale 0-6) 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: Data refer to Version 3 of the employment protection summary indicator for 2008. Indicators for France 
and Portugal correspond to 2009 in order to reflect recent reforms. 
Source: IILS estimates based on OECD employment protection indicators. 
 




                                                
…and has changed in the current era of globalisation. 
 
Since 1992 the dominant tendency among countries for which information exists has been a 
reduction in the strictness of employment protection. Moreover, countries with the highest 
levels of employment protection exhibit some of the largest reductions (e.g. Belgium, Italy 
and Spain).
22 In general, most of the relaxation of the level of employment protection is 
associated with facilitating temporary work (Figure 10). But there are also countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) where wide-ranging 
changes have reduced stringency of regulation for both permanent and temporary contracts. 
Finally, in Belgium, Germany and Greece increases in the stringency of regulation in some 
areas were offset by relaxation of regulation in others. This is the case of Germany where an 
extension in the duration of fixed-term contracts was permitted – specifically for the hiring of 
older unemployed workers and for cases in which new businesses were created – but at the 
same time a legislated compensation for dismissals was established. 
 
 
22 The exceptions are France, where the trial period for regular contracts was increased; Mexico, which shows 
no change; and Turkey, which despite having one of the highest levels of stringency shows a minor reduction in 




Figure 10. Variation on strictness of employment protection between 1992 and 2008, for 
permanent and temporary workers  






















































































Change in EPL for permanent workers  between 2008 and 1992
 
*Data shown corresponds to Version 1 of the employment protection summary indicator for 1992 and 2008 and 
therefore are not directly comparable to Figure 5. 





On the basis of the different flexibility models explained above (Table 1) one could expect 
that countries with strong employment protection for the core labour force will see a decline 
in ‘atypical jobs’ first – and probably only there – with total employment remaining more 




  With little exception, temporary workers have borne the brunt of employment losses 
across countries. 
  Some of the countries with high employment protection against dismissal for regular 
workers (e.g. Slovenia) indeed show higher employment losses of temporary workers 
                                                 
23 This finding is consistent with the theoretical and econometric results that the costs and benefits associated to 
the existence of employment protection legislation are rather inconclusive. See for example, Freynes 




than of their core employees. However, comparisons with other countries with lower 
employment protection for their core labour force often show lower employment 
losses. 
  This phenomenon does not seem to be restricted to countries with high EPL for 
permanent workers. Countries with low (e.g. Ireland and Italy) and medium (e.g. 
Estonia, Finland, Hungary Luxembourg, Slovak Republic and Sweden) levels of EPL 
for regular workers exhibit similar relationships between the effect of the crisis on 
total and temporary employment. 
 
Figure 11. Variation of total and temporary employment since the onset of the crisis by 
strictness of employment protection for permanent workers against dismissal, select 

























































































































































Employment change Temporary employment change
LowEPL Medium EPL High EPL
 
Note: Changes in temporary employment are changes measured from peak to trough (by quarter); where a 
trough has not yet been attained, the latest available information is used. The beginning of the crisis is country-
specific and is measured as the first term showing a negative change in total employment.  
Source: IILS estimates based on: OECD employment protection indicators; Eurostat database; and national 
statistical offices.  
 
Even when analysing the issue of employment protection legislation for regular workers and 
its role in shaping the outcomes of the crisis more generally – i.e. output and employment – a 
rather ambiguous relationship arises. Indeed, as Figure 12 indicates the impacts of the crisis 
in terms of GDP and employment appear to have little to do with the level stringency of 
employment protection. Some of the least affected G20 countries (e.g. Australia and to a 
lesser extent Argentina and Brazil) as well as the hardest hit (e.g. Ireland) have comparably 




Figure 12. Strictness of employment protection for regular workers and the effects of the 








































-20 -15 -10 -5 0
Change in Real GDP  
 
 
Note: For details on the division of countries by level of development and calculations regarding the impact of the 
crisis on GDP and employment, please see Figure 4. 
Source: IILS estimates based on: OECD employment protection indicators; OECD, Economic Outlook No. 86; 





Instruments of internal flexibility have been widespread during the crisis to limit employment 
losses. Among 33 countries (G20 and EU27), 31 have experienced significant falls in 
working hours since the onset of the crisis (-2.1 per cent on average, Figure 13). This is in 
stark contrast to the increases (22 of 33 countries) experienced in hours worked between 2007 
and 2008 (ILO, 2009). Following these changes – not surprisingly – the incidence of part-
time employment in total employment has also increased since the onset of the crisis in 25 of 
the 31 countries analysed. However, when analysing these changes in terms of the stringency 
of employment protection across countries, no clear relationship is evident. Indeed, countries 
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Figure 13. Change in average number of hours worked per employed person, by level of 



























































































































































































Note: Data for Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain and the United States refer to Q3 2009 and Q3 2008, 
respectively. 




Wages – in particular wage cuts – can also act as an adjustment mechanism in times of crisis. 
In fact, countries which have managed to limit employment losses in comparison to other 
countries (e.g. Japan, Germany, Indonesia and the Republic of Korea) are also countries 
where real wages have fallen (or grown less) than in other countries (Figure 14). In some 
cases, e.g. Japan, this is associated with falling hours worked per week due to employment 
sharing schemes. In other countries, e.g. the Republic of Korea, it is the result of negotiations 
between social partners to save jobs.  




Figure 14. Change in real wages, Q4 2007 to Q4 2009* 
 (percentages) 



















































































































































































































Note: *Changes for the Republic of Korea correspond to the period Q1 2007–Q1 2009; for Finland to the period 
Q2 2007–Q2 2009; and for Austria and the United Kingdom to the period Q3 2007–Q3 2009. Figures for 
Australia correspond to weekly wages. 
Source: World of Work Report 2010 (ILO, 2010a) based on ILO, Crisis database and Global Wage database 
following national statistical sources. 
 
Countries that tend to exhibit higher wage flexibility also tend to have lower collective 
bargaining coverage (Table 2). This is indeed observable for the Anglo-Saxon cases, Japan 
and Republic of Korea, as well as for the new CEE member countries. Of course, while there 
are a number of factors that explain wage dispersion (technological change, evolving work 
patterns and non-standard forms of employment, etc.), collective bargaining coverage and 
minimum wages tend to limit the extent of wage distribution.
24 This is particularly the case in 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. Only in Austria and Spain 
does high coverage accompany relatively high wage inequality. In Austria, this can be 
explained by a tradition of competitiveness-oriented corporatism that allows for some wage 
flexibility. In Spain, it may reflect the divide in skills distribution, the large share of 
temporary employment or the trend increase in low-productivity jobs in the construction 
sector before the crisis (see below). In Germany wage dispersion has grown alongside a 
decline in collective bargaining coverage, especially in the service sector (and in the absence 
of a statutory minimum wage). A notable exception to the pattern is Switzerland, where wage 
dispersion is limited despite rather liberal wage-setting institutions. 
 
                                                 
24 Already before the onset of the crisis, wages were not growing in line with productivity. See ILO (2008): 
World of work report 2008: Income inequalities in the age of financial globalization (Geneva, International 




Table 2. Collective bargaining coverage, wage dispersion and minimum wages in the OECD 
(mid-2000s) 
 
Country  Collective Bargaining 
Coverage  Wage Dispersion  Minimum Wage Relative to 
Average Wage 
Australia  60.0 per cent  3.31  0.52 
Austria  99.0 per cent  3.37  - 
Belgium  96.0 per cent  2.43  0.51 
Canada  31.5 per cent  3.75  0.42 
Czech Rep.  44.0 per cent  3.11  0.35 
Denmark  82.0 per cent  2.69  - 
Finland  90.0 per cent  2.55  - 
France  95.0 per cent  2.91  0.63 
Germany  63.0 per cent  3.26  - 
Hungary  35.0 per cent  4.56  0.47 
Ireland  66.0 per cent  3.78  0.53 
Italy  80.0 per cent  -  - 
Japan  16.1 per cent  3.06  0.35 
Korea  12.0 per cent  4.74  0.39 
Netherlands  82.0 per cent  2.91  0.43 
New Zealand  30.0 per cent  2.94  0.59 
Norway  72.0 per cent  2.11   
Poland  35.0 per cent  4.21  0.45 
Portugal  62.0 per cent  -  0.47 
Slovakia  35.0 per cent  -  0.43 
Spain  80.0 per cent  3.53  0.45 
Sweden  92.0 per cent  2.31  - 
Switzerland  48.0 per cent  2.65  - 
United Kingdom  34.8 per cent  3.59  0.46 
USA  13.5 per cent  4.85  0.34 




Generally, tax and benefit systems work as automatic stabilisers during economic crises. In 
particular, the combined effect of unemployment benefits, direct taxes and social security 
contributions on the stabilisation of income and demand can be simulated in order to assess 
the extent of automatic stabilisation (Dolls et al, 2009). Assuming a 5 percent unemployment 
shock, i.e. an increase of the unemployment rate by five percentage points, stabilisation 
through the tax/benefit system would lead to a stabilisation of more than two thirds in 
Austria, Denmark and Sweden – with Belgium and Germany following closely (Figure 15). 
This is both a result of unemployment benefit receipt and a decline in tax receipts.  


















Source: Dolls et al, 2009.  
 
The problem, however, is that unemployment benefits often do not exist in emerging and 
developing counties. Even in the few cases where unemployment benefit systems do exist, 
they are often restricted to urban areas, e.g. as is the case in China. For advanced economies, 
similarly, while many have such schemes in place, there is often a set of criteria for access 
(e.g. minimum number of hours worked). Consequently, job losers are often not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. As a result, the share of unemployed receiving benefits varies 
considerably across countries (Figure 16).
25 
                                                 
25 See also ILO 2009b: The Financial and Economic Crisis. A Decent Work Response (Geneva, International 















































Source: ILO, World Social Security Report 2010: Providing coverage in the time of crisis and beyond. April 
2010. Geneva. 
 
Among workers receiving benefits, the level of benefit generosity plays a significant role in 
terms of supporting worker adjustment (best measured by the OECD’s net replacement rates 
for the first month of unemployment). Both for single average earners and for sole earners in 
married couples, data for the OECD countries reveals significant differences across countries 
(Figure 17). Income losses stemming from unemployment are quite small in most continental 
European countries and most Northern countries. On the other hand, the Mediterranean and 































































































































































































































































Interestingly, active labour market policies and unemployment benefits as well as short-term 
work subsidies have been reinforced alongside fiscal stimulus packages. Hence, reintegrating 
unemployed individuals into the labour market but also providing better income replacement 
for the unemployed have been major concerns. Given the fact that some groups are more at 
risk of becoming unemployed than others – and these groups are often less-protected by 
unemployment insurance (e.g. employees with fixed-term contracts or agency workers), there 
has been a major tendency to expand unemployment benefits and ease benefit access in 
particular for these groups. Among a survey of 54 ILO countries, nearly a third extended 
unemployment benefit coverage or implemented additional social assistance or protection 
measures.
26 Similarly, over a quarter introduced partial unemployment benefit schemes with 
training or part-time work. Among OECD countries, the average annual additional 
expenditures expected – in discretionary ALMPS – in response to the economic crisis was in 
some cases substantial (Figure 18).  
 
                                                 































































































































































Source: OECD 2009. 
C.  Country case studies 
 
The following section attempts to explore in more detail – i.e. at the country level – the role 
internal flexibility in the context of the current crisis. The analysis will focus on the cases of 




Germany is a country which was heavily affected by the steep decline in international trade 
which, in turn, led to a significant fall in orders and exports especially in core areas of the 
production model such as machinery and car manufacturing. However, despite its 
vulnerability due to the dependency on exports and the associated GDP decline of five 
percent in 2009, unemployment remained stable initially, rising marginally, and employment 
fell only marginally compared to other countries.  
 
Employment stability is due to a number of factors of course. First, strong growth in major 
parts of the service sector helped offset losses in export-oriented sectors such as 
manufacturing and logistics. Second, the relative success of Germany is partly explained by 
the fact that the core labour market of skilled workers in manufacturing is covered by strong 
legal dismissal protection – hence, short-term adjustment does not lead to quick layoffs but is 
dominated by an elaborate arrangement of internal flexibility. Three elements are crucial:  
 
1.  Internal flexibility: internal flexibility has already increased considerably over the last 
two decades both within in the framework of collective bargaining and at the level of 
the enterprise. Hence, working time can be adjusted flexibly via working time 
accounts. In fact, while employment was unchanged from mid-2008 to mid-2009, the 
total volume of hours worked decline by about five percent. At the same time, the 
social partners also allowed for the adjustment of bargained wages or postponements 




2.  Concentration of redundancies in the marginal workforce: over the last five years, 
manufacturing employers increasingly relied on temporary agency staff to establish a 
flexible segment of the workforce which can be adjusted swiftly under uncertain 
economic prospects. Therefore, when the crisis began, employers started to reduce the 
number of agency workers by about 300,000 and thus limited job destruction to this 
category of workers. At a smaller scale, the same is true for the non-renewal of fixed-
term contracts.  
3.  Heavy reliance on a public short-time work allowance: practices of this nature are 
embodied in the institutional repertoire of the unemployment insurance and active 
labour market policy system (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009). The short-time work or 
partial unemployment scheme was, of course, already in place before the crisis began, 
but it has been modified in three aspects: (i) the maximum duration for which hours 
not worked are reimbursed by the unemployment fund at the regular replacement rate 
applicable in case of unemployment was increased from six to 24 months for inflow 
in 2009 (18 months in 2010), (ii) for cases of short-time work arising in 2009 and 
2010, employers are relieved from social security contributions for hours not worked 
– regarding employee contributions from the first day of short-time work, regarding 
employer contributions from the seventh month of reduced working time (or earlier in 
case of employer-provided training), (iii) administrative requirements for firms 
entering this scheme were simplified considerably.  
 
Given the abrupt character of the crisis and the uncertainty of its duration, employers have 
been reluctant to dismiss skilled staff as long as partial unemployment was feasible and a 
recovery – if partial – expected. In that respect, the internal flexibility mechanisms such as 
working-time flexibility and complementary short-time work allowances discussed above 
appear to have been successful in mitigating employment losses. And as exports show some 
preliminary signs of recovery, the gap may have been sufficiently bridged. At the same time, 
the marginal workforce has borne the brunt of job losses and most workers have witnessed 




In the decade before the crisis, Denmark became a celebrated model country for the 
“flexicurity” approach. The combination of its traditionally flexible labour law, generous 
unemployment benefits and active labour market policies ensured a rather smooth 
functioning of the employment model. Thanks to this “golden triangle” the Danish labour 
market was characterised by high mobility and far above-average employment rates with 
unemployment virtually non-existent. 
 
However, the recent crisis had a comparatively strong impact on the economy and especially 
on the labour market with the unemployment rate more than doubling to reach upwards of 7 
per cent. One reason for the strong impacts is that the Danish employment system features 
less internal institutional buffers against an output shock. As one would expect, liberal 
dismissal regulation contributes to a large inflow into unemployment in an economic crisis. 
However, labour market recovery should be more dynamic once the economy returns to 
growth as hiring barriers are lower and activation policies are in place.  
 
Whether this institutional advantage of the Danish model will prove to be beneficial in the 
near future also depends on the second aspect of the flexicurity concept – social security and 




Even after five years of unemployment, net benefits of previous low-wage earners can 
amount to more than eighty percent. This is the most generous level in the OECD (average: 
45 percent). To diminish disincentives to take up work, labour market reforms in previous 
years have strengthened the activation of unemployed. While active labour market policies 
were sufficient to promote employment in normal economic times, it remains to be seen how 
the system will work against the background of severe unemployment. So far, Danish active 
labour market policies are characterised by policy continuity – also with respect to activation 
strategies trying to increase labour supply.  
 
The crisis also revealed the macro-economic advantages of a high level of social protection. 
It can be shown that unemployment insurance had a significant effect as an automatic 
stabiliser in those countries with sufficient levels of income protection (e.g. vis-à-vis the 
United States). This holds true for Denmark in particular. Together with Austria and Sweden, 
the income stabilisation effect of benefits is the largest in the OECD (see Section B above). 
In a similar fashion the budget available for active measures is tied to the development of the 
unemployment rate. Therefore, the Danish regime adapts automatically and needs less 
discretionary intervention by policy makers. 
 
Hence, although the crisis had a severe impact, by supporting incomes the generous Danish 
welfare state is also helping to support aggregate demand and lessen the overall impact. This 
is an insight that should be reflected in the reform discussions of countries that traditionally 
refrain from implementing strong automatic stabilisers. Going forward, the Danish 
experience has shown that the right mix of welfare state generosity and activation is crucial to 
reconcile both objectives in times of recovery. While the country has been very successful in 




Concerning the international economic crisis, the Spanish labour market is one of the hardest-
hit in the European Union. The unemployment rate was 20 per cent in April 2010: the highest 
in over 13 years and double the EU average. The origins of the devastating impact lie 
partially in its exposure to a vulnerable sector but also in the extent of labour market duality.  
 
The pre-crisis period in Spain was characterised by above-average growth rates, strong job 
growth and significant reductions in unemployment. Much of the growth stemmed from the 
strong housing and construction sector but with the onset of the housing price bubble, 
employment losses were particularly severe in the oversized (in retrospect) sector.   
 
In addition, Spain has relatively flexible job protection regulation at the margin of the labour 
market. As opposed to strictly regulated permanent contracts, temporary workers form a very 
flexible tier in the labour market. While this pattern of asymmetric flexibility is by now quite 
typical for highly regulated European labour markets, Spain in this regard is an extreme case. 
Before the crisis, approximately one third of all employees worked on a fixed-term contract. 
Moreover, around 85 percent of all employees working on a temporary contract do so 
involuntarily with as many as two-thirds holding a contract with a duration of six months or 
less (twice as high as the EU-15 average) 
 
Much like Germany – although to a greater extent – this segment of highly flexible workers 
mainly carried the burden of labour market adaptation in the recent recession. Between the 




decreased from 32 to 26 percent – accounting for close to 90 percent of the jobs lost (or more 
than 1.2 million workers). At the same time, employment among permanent workers has been 
relatively stable. 
 
Similarly, in an attempt to encourage German-style employment retention, social security 
payments were lowered for companies that reduced employees’ working hours instead of 
dismissing them. In addition, wage subsidies for workers on short hours and subsidies for 
companies hiring part-time workers were created. Hence, Spanish policy makers tried to 
stimulate policies in favour of working time and therefore internal flexibility which is seen as 
a better alternative to excessive external flexibility stemming from fixed-term contracts. At 
the same time, policy makers also extended unemployment benefits. However, unlike 
Germany, the experience of Spain has been unsuccessful. 
  
A possible reason for the failure of this programme to prevent unemployment from rising 
continuously may be in the characteristics of the laid-off workers. The jobs that were created 
in the upswing preceding the crisis and which were subsequently lost were predominantly 
low-productivity jobs in construction. The lack of success may have much to do with the 
absence of skill-oriented internal flexibility – as is the case in the German manufacturing 
sector adjustment. 
 
Hence, there are deeper-rooted challenges for the Spanish employment model: to shift job-
creation to sectors with higher productivity and to overcome segmentation in the labour 
market. Concerning the latter, the lessons of the crisis do not seem to have increased chances 
for reform. While there has been an expansion of unemployment benefits to counter social 




The United Kingdom was also heavily hit by the current crisis – but in contrast to Spain and 
Germany, the British economy was hit initially by virtue of its role as Europe’s financial 
centre, which had benefited from a dynamic development of the banking sector and strong 
housing price growth for many years (Bell and Blanchflower 2009). This has been associated 
with a dynamic development of job creation in the private service sector. High exposure to 
global financial business and, at the same time, a quite flexible labour market and a smaller 
welfare state – compared to most Continental European countries – imply a high vulnerability 
of the labour market. Compared with, for example, Germany, external flexibility is more 
dominant than internal adjustment of firms. In accordance with a pattern dominated by 
external flexibility, working time adjustment did not contribute significantly to the 
adjustment process following the recent shock. More flexibility is thus observed with respect 
to wages in the private sector.  
 
In good times, a less-regulated labour market can contribute to strong employment growth; in 
bad times this reduces the buffering effect of intra-organisational arrangements. At the same 
time, the tax/benefit system in the United Kingdom provides less automatic stabilisation than 
Continental European or Scandinavian countries. While the increase in unemployment was 
stronger in the United Kingdom than it was in Germany, it was less in comparison to 
Denmark, Spain or the United States. A more in-depth analysis shows that, at least until 
recently, job losses in the private sector were compensated for by a stable and still-expanding 
public sector. Major job cuts could be observed in the vulnerable exposed sectors such as 





Given the limited role of automatic stabilisation and the size of the shock experienced by the 
British economy, it is interesting to see that the United Kingdom adopted a larger-than-
average fiscal stimulus package which helped mitigate the immediate labour market impact 
of the crisis but is now contributing to pressures to reduce fiscal deficits and debt. At the 
same time, the United Kingdom is also one of the countries which implemented the most 
comprehensive crisis-related reforms in the realm of unemployment protection and active 
labour market policies. Here, the existing institutional repertoire was expanded in order to 
cope with increasing unemployment and speed up reintegration into employment. 
Discretionary policy-making complemented active labour market instruments which were 
already in place at the outset of the current crisis such as the JobCentre Plus and Rapid 
Response Services to achieve a broader activation with more intensive support for all 
jobseekers out of work for more than six months, an activation guarantee for young people 
and a more general scheme implemented in fall 2009 ('Flexible New Deal') replacing earlier, 
more selective ones. Furthermore, incentives for employers which recruit and train people 
who have been unemployed for at least six months were introduced and extra funding was 
given for training, not only for unemployed people but also for start-up support.  
D.  Conclusions 
 
The labour market impact of the current crisis has varied considerably across countries – 
irrespective of the GDP loss. Certainly, the magnitude, the timing and the composition of 
stimulus efforts have helped to mitigate the effects. Similarly, the structure of the economy 
and exposure to certain vulnerable sectors, e.g. construction, has in some case exacerbated 
job loss. The purpose of this study, however, is to shed light on the extent to which pre-
existing institutional arrangements, in combination with labour market related policies, can 
explain some of the variation in labour market performance. 
  
Early indications are that countries that could rely on strong internal flexibility were better 
able to control employment losses and rising unemployment. This was achieved by protecting 
the core labour market through relatively strict employment protection and making labour 
market adjustments via working hours (and wages) rather than through layoffs. For example, 
in Germany working time accounts and complementary short-time work allowances helped 
stabilise the manufacturing sector with adjustments in employment occurring at the margins.  
 
However, such schemes have important distributional consequences, i.e. non-standard 
workers have borne the brunt of employment losses, deepening labour market dualization. 
This is particularly apparent in the case of Spain where the termination of temporary 
contracts is a major channel of adjustment. Non-standard workers not only face a higher risk 
of unemployment, they also tend to be less well protected in terms of access to labour market 
support such as unemployment insurance. In the case of Spain, they also tend to less well 
equipped to take up new jobs. As a result, non-standard workers are disadvantaged twice: 
first, in terms of employment stability, and second, in terms of access to adequate social 
benefits and active labour market support. 
 
There is an urgent need to move towards more equal distribution of risks and benefits. In this 
respect, the role of automatic stabilisers such as unemployment benefits merits special 
attention. They provide much needed income and labour market support (e.g. training) at the 




available to a wider group of workers and not just the core labour force. Moreover, automatic 
stabilisers are also just that – automatic – and therefore easier and more efficient to 
implement than discretionary measures which tend to create greater challenges in terms of 
appropriate implementation and often can only become effective after a certain time lag. 
Indeed, many policy initiatives during the crisis illustrate that discretionary changes in social 
and labour market policies were tied to existing programmes (e.g. expansion of short-time 
work, more generous unemployment benefits or hiring subsidies, more training or job search 
assistance) rather than introducing completely new elements.  
 
In sum, keeping unemployment low by means of internal flexibility and complementary 
public support via automatic or discretionary policy interventions has shown some early signs 
of success – at least in the short term and in spite of the magnitude of the crisis. However, as 
the recovery begins to take hold, there are important implications for structural adjustment as 
this will require a different policy approach. In particular, rather than one grounded in 
bridging the temporary loss of demand by subsidising sectors that may be in decline, action 
will be needed to stimulate economic innovation and labour market mobility. This means 
promoting external flexibility and job reallocation and encouraging internal functional 
flexibility through lifelong learning and workplace-related training. Here the role of effective 
active labour market policies, i.e. job search assistance and training as well as on hiring 
subsidies and start-up grants will be essential to encouraging quick and sustainable 
reemployment. For the moment, however, the employment recovery is fragile at best. In 
many instances, employment continues to fall and therefore crisis-related stabilisation 
measures are still needed and if properly designed can help to encourage an overall recovery 
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